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Abstract
Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) have demonstrated that
neural networks can exceed human performance in many tasks, includ-
ing vision. While generalizing well over natural inputs, neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial inputs. An adversarially perturbed input is
“similar” to the original input, but misclassified by the model.
Existing defenses against adversarial inputs have largely been detached
from the real world. They focus on ℓp-norm bounded adversaries that per-
turb ML inputs in the digital space. In the real world, however, attackers
can generate adversarial perturbations that have a large ℓp-norm in the
digital space. These perturbations, while misinterpreted by ML models,
can be indiscernible to humans. These defenses also come at a cost to
accuracy, making their applicability questionable in the real world.
To defend models against such a powerful adversary, we can lever-
age one constraint on its power: the perturbation should not change the
human’s perception of the physical information; the physical world places
some constraints on the space of possible attacks. Two questions follow:
how to extract and model these constraints? and how to design a clas-
sification paradigm that leverages these constraints to improve robustness
accuracy trade-off?
We observe that an ML model is typically a part of a larger system
with access to different input modalities. Utilizing these modalities, we
introduce invariants that limit the attacker’s action space. We design a
hierarchical classification paradigm that enforces these invariants at in-
ference time. We find that applying invariants to the classification task
makes robustness and accuracy feasible together.
As a case study, we implement and evaluate our proposal in the con-
text of the real-world application of road sign classification because of
its applicability to autonomous driving. With access to different input
modalities, such as LiDAR, camera, and location we show how to extract
invariants and develop a hierarchical classifier. Our results on the KITTI
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and GTSRB datasets show that we can improve the robustness against
physical attacks at minimal harm to accuracy.
1 Introduction
Widespread adoption of Machine Learning (ML) for critical tasks brought along
the question of trust: Are ML models robust in making correct decisions when
safety is at risk? Despite the significant advances in deep learning, near-human
performance on several tasks did not translate to robustness in adversarial set-
tings [42]. Several ML models, especially Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), are
found susceptible to perturbed inputs with grave safety implications [4, 21, 32].
An attacker can adversarially modify an input example, such as pixels in an
image, so that a classifier would mislabel the input. Such perturbations leave
semantics of the input unperturbed, to the point that humans are often unable
to discern differences between the original input and the perturbed input.
While many defenses have been proposed to make ML models more robust,
only a few have survived the onslaught of attacks [2]. Among these defenses are
certification [34], randomized smoothing [11, 27], and adversarial training [30].
The common theme across these defenses is to ensure that the model’s output
is stable within an ℓp-norm ball around the input.
These defenses against adversarial examples have largely been detached from
the real world. They focus on providing robustness guarantees within an ℓp-
norm ball around an input without considering the semantic and contextual
properties of the classification problem. Further, these defenses suffer significant
degradation in accuracy [43, 24, 11, 27]. The main problem lies in that ℓp-norm
bounds are incapable of capturing the geometry of decision boundaries in the
task’s original input domain [24], which leads to the tension between accuracy
and robustness. Recent results in literature have demonstrated that there are
settings where robustness and accuracy cannot be simultaneously achieved [43,
5, 1]. Thus, the design of efficient and robust DNN classifiers remains an open
research problem [7].
How can we defend against powerful adversaries and avoid the shortcomings
of previous defenses? Fortunately, there is one constraint on the power of the
adversary: the perturbation should not change the human’s interpretation of
the physical object; the physical world places some constraints on the space of
possible attacks. These physical constraints, when enforced on the attacker, limit
its attack space – making the classifier more robust. In this paper, we show that
we can use physical constraints to improve robustness at no additional accuracy
cost.
Take the example of classifying a US road sign (Fig. 1). A US road sign
classified as a stop sign has to obey shape, color, and location constraints. The
shape of the road sign is an octagon, its color is mostly red, and its location
must be at an intersection. If the defender has access to shape, color, and/or
location information, then it can narrow down the set of possible labels. An
attacker can no longer generate arbitrary perturbations; its perturbations have
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Figure 1: The LiDAR depth measurements are immune to physical perturba-
tions, including changes in lighting, and any stickers placed on the US road
sign.
to obey the constraints that the defender imposes. Forcing the adversary to
satisfy constraints from the physical world increases the attack’s cost relative to
its resources, thereby satisfying Saltzer and Shroeder’s “work factor” principle
for the design of secure systems [36].
This paper addresses three questions related to employing physical con-
straints. First, how can we extract and model these physical constraints? Sec-
ond, can we design a classification regime that utilizes these constraints? Third,
does the accuracy-robustness trade-off improve?
Modeling Constraints We model physical world constraints as invariants
or relations on the model’s input space. Two input samples abide by a con-
straint if they satisfy the invariant. We present different examples of invariants
and show that they generalize previously proposed concepts, such as robust fea-
tures [43, 23]. Enforcing these invariants on an attacker introduces additional
constraints on its adversarial space, which we demonstrate improves robustness.
In particular, we prove that applying invariants affects results from literature
that present statistical [43] and computational [1] settings where accuracy and
robustness fail to coexist (Sec. 3).
Hierarchical Classification In the real world, it is useful to view the classifi-
cation problem within the context of a larger system, with access to multi-modal
or multi-sensor inputs. We consider invariants that utilize additional modalities
to define high-level attributes. These attributes split the output space of the
classifier into equivalence classes, thereby partitioning the classification problem
into smaller pieces. Leveraging the invariants, we design a hierarchical classifica-
tion scheme that mimics a decision tree. At the decision nodes of the hierarchy,
we have classifiers that extract the high-level attributes. At the leaves of the
hierarchy, we have classifiers that predict within an equivalence class of labels
(Sec. 4).
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Robustness-Accuracy Improvement Employing the invariants within the
hierarchical classifier provides robustness gains on two levels. On the high-level,
a sequence of invariants limits the prediction to an equivalence class of labels.
Equivalence classes limit the adversary’s targeted attack capability; they can
only target labels within the equivalence class. On the lower level, we show that
reducing the number of labels improves the robustness of the classifier compared
to the original classifier predicting within the full set of labels. More impor-
tantly, we show that these gains in robustness do not harm accuracy (Sec. 4.2
and Sec. 4.3).
As a case study of the real-world application of the invariants and the pro-
posed hierarchical classifier, we study the problem of road sign classification in
the context of autonomous vehicles. This study is motivated by recent work
which demonstrates that both state-of-the-art machine learning classifiers, as
well as detectors, are susceptible to real-world physical perturbations [13, 12].
Existing defenses can do little to protect against these physical perturbations,
characterized with large ℓp-norms.
We demonstrate that invariants (consequently improved robustness) can be
realized by a combination of additional modalities, such as LiDAR point clouds
and GPS information. These invariants place physical, structural, and semantic
constraints on the classification task. Fig. 1 shows an example of a perturbed
STOP sign using adversarial patches from previous work [13]. This sign is
misclassified as a speed limit sign. The depth map extracted from LiDAR shows
that the shape of the sign is still an octagon, which could never refer to a speed
limit sign. Sec. 5 further elaborates on using physical constraints to improve
the robustness of the safety-critical task of road sign classification. Our results
on the GTSRB [41] and KITTI [16] datasets show that:
1. Without additional (re)training, the proposed hierarchical classification
approach improves the robustness for the same model architecture while
keeping the accuracy comparable. For triangular signs, our proposed ap-
proach yields an average increase in robustness by 60% (Sec. 5.3). The
insight enabling this result is that state-of-the-art physically realizable ad-
versarial attacks do not modify the robust features under consideration.
2. Extending the hierarchy using multiple invariants further improves robust-
ness. In our case study, we combined shape and location constraints to
obtain an average increase of ¿80% for speed limit signs (circular signs at
a given geographic location) (Sec. 5.3.3).
To recap, this paper introduces invariants to model the physical world con-
straints. Then, it provides the design and analysis of a hierarchical classification
paradigm that utilizes these invariants. We evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed classification paradigm using road sign classification as a case study.
While our case study is within the context of computer vision, the underlying
ideas and techniques apply to other domains, such as audio classification.
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2 Background
This section provides the background necessary for our discussion on invariants
and hierarchical classifiers. We present the notation on classification, follow
with a threat model, and outline recent defense mechanisms.
2.1 Classification and Notation
We represent a classification task as a function F which accepts an input x ∈ X ,
where X , and outputs y ∈ Rm. We consider classifiers where y = F (x) is a
probability distribution over a set of labels L = {1, · · · ,m}. We denote by Fi(x)
as the probability that the input x has the label i, such that 0 ≤ Fi(x) ≤ 1 and∑m
i=1 Fi(x) = 1. In neural networks, F usually refers to the softmax layer of the
network. The classifier assigns the input x a label c = C(x) = argmaxi Fi(x).
The runner-up label is defined as C2(x) = argmaxi6=C(x) Fi(x) and the true label
as C∗(x).
The data distribution D is a distribution over X ×L; this is the distribution
from which the data is drawn.
2.2 Threat Model
We consider attacks on the classification task, where an attacker applies a
perturbation to the input to change the classification output. A targeted at-
tacker generates a perturbation, δ, that modifies the classification output to
a predetermined label, y∗. Formally, the attacker aims to have C(x + δ) =
y∗, where C(x) 6= y∗. On the other hand, an untargeted attacker seeks a per-
turbation δ such that C(x+δ) 6= C(x). In this paper, we define natural accuracy
as the model’s accuracy on unperturbed inputs, and adversarial accuracy as the
model’s accuracy on adversarially perturbed inputs.
We consider a white-box attacker with full knowledge of the model’s architec-
ture and parameters. Given this knowledge, the attacker can perform two types
of attacks: digital-space and physical space attacks. Digital-space attacks rep-
resent attacks that perturb the direct inputs to the ML model; such attacks are
not necessarily realized in the physical world. These attacks, typically, involve
a solution to an optimization problem: search for the smallest perturbation δ
(represented as the ℓp-norm,‖δ‖p=∞,p≥0) to be added to the input x, such that
the perturbed instance x˜ = x+ δ is misclassified by the classifier:
min ‖δ‖p, s.t.
C(x+ δ) = y∗ (targeted)
or C(x + δ) 6= C(X) (untargeted).
Attacks in the physical spaces move beyond digitally manipulated input im-
ages to craft realizable adversarial examples. Generating physically realizable
adversarial examples involves modifying the optimization problem above to ac-
count for physical transformations. For example, these transformations manifest
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in varying lighting conditions, angles, and distances in the image domain [3], or
manifest in different acoustic channel models in the audio case [47]. Other phys-
ical attacks involve “semantic” adversarial examples [13, 12, 37, 38, 26] in which
the adversary adds physical objects that change the classification output. This
process involves constraining the optimization problem by introducing structure
into adversarial examples (e.g., patches in images).
2.3 Robustness Certificates
Different defense approaches aim at providing a robustness certificate for a clas-
sifier [27, 28, 11, 34]. The robustness certificate (denoted as RC(x,R)) implies
the following:
∀ z ∈ Bp(x,R) · C(z) = C(x)
The above means that the predicted label of F (x) does not change in the R-
ball around x. The R-ball is formally defined as: Bp(x,R) = {z ∈ X | ‖z −
x‖p < R}. There are several robust defenses in the literature. We focus on
one representative approach: randomized smoothing, which scales with large
networks but provides conservative robustness bounds. Other approaches [34]
attempt to bound the local Lipschitz constant of the network around an input to
provide robustness guarantees. These approaches do not scale to large networks.
Randomized Smoothing
This approach transforms a classifier F to a smoothed one g that can certify
robustness of an input x in the ℓ2-norm space [27, 28, 11]. Smoothing a classi-
fier involves adding noise to the input, drawn from a 0-mean distribution, and
training the network on these noisy inputs. The prediction of the smoothed
classifier is taken by estimating the probability of each class’s decision region
under the distribution of the added noise.
In the most recent approach of Cohen et al. [11], the smoothed classifier’s
prediction is defined as the class whose decision region is the highest under
N (x, σ2) . The intuition is that if the adversarial perturbation (‖δ‖2) is small
enough, the probability measure of the decision regions should be similar be-
tween N (x, σ2) and N (x + δ, σ2) [11]. The probability of each class’s decision
region is empirically estimated through running Monte Carlo simulations under
the distribution N (x, σ2).
A lower bound on the robustness certificate of each input x for the smoothed
classifier g is given as:
R ≥ σ
2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
, (1)
where Φ−1 is the inverse of standard Gaussian CDF, pA is the lower bound of
P (C(x + ǫ) = C(x)) – the probability of top label, and pB is the upper bound
bound of maxc 6=C(x) P (C(x + ǫ) = c) – the probability of runner-up label, and
ǫ is drawn from N (0, σ2). Other certified smoothing approaches have similar
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robustness bounds that are functions of the margin between the top and runner-
up labels in the base classifiers [27].
2.4 Adversarial Training
Finally, adversarial training is an empirical defense strategy that builds on ro-
bust optimization. One such defense was proposed by Madry et al. [30]. This
strategy casts the defender’s problem as min-max formulation [45, 22]:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where: ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
x˜∈Bp(x,R)
L(θ, x˜, y)
]
(2)
This approach trains a classifier that minimizes the adversarial loss under
an ℓp-norm bounded adversary. The inner max is solved using any attack that
generates adversarial examples within Bp(x,R). Madry et al. employ the Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack which works well for ℓp-norm bounded
attackers.
Another adversarial training technique is based on distributional robust op-
timization [39]. The min-max formulation is similar to the above with two
exceptions. First, the inner max is taken over perturbing the input data distri-
bution in a Wasserstein ball. Second, the inner max is formulated as maximizing
the loss under the perturbed distribution subject to the Lagrangian penalty of
the Wasserstein distance between the original and perturbed data distributions.
3 Invariants
In their quest to provide ℓp-norm robustness bounds, defense approaches de-
grade accuracy on natural (unperturbed) examples [30, 11, 27]. While simple
architectures based on simple datasets (such as MNIST) maintain a relatively
high natural accuracy (larger than 90%), other architectures have a significant
drop in accuracy, reaching the lower 40s [11]. Most realistic prediction tasks are
not MNIST-like, and robust defenses come at a considerable cost in accuracy,
even for modest robustness bounds.
In this paper, we propose enforcing real-world constraints to limit the adver-
sary’s attack space. We show that constraining the attacker through additional
information from the physical world improves the defender’s trade-off between
accuracy and robustness. Three questions arise related to employing physical
constraints: (1) how to extract and model these physical constraints? (2) how
to design a classification technique that employs these constraints? and (3)
how to quantify the resulting accuracy-robustness trade-off? The rest of this
section addresses the first question, while Sec. 4 addresses the second and third
questions.
3.1 Invariant Model
We model a physical-world constraint as an invariant I ⊆ X × X . A physical
constraint limits the adversary to the invariant I so that it can perturb x to
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x˜ = f(x) but has to maintain: (x, x˜) ∈ I. This formulation allows us to express
different forms of the physical invariants. Two examples of invariants are:
• Suppose S : X → Z is a function (e.g. for intuition, think S(x) as the
shape of image x). One formulation for the invariant is as follows:
{(x, x˜) ∈ I iff S(x) = S(x˜)}
In other words, the adversary needs to “preserve” the output of the func-
tion S. In our shape example, this invariant corresponds to the adversary
not being able to change the shape. For example, if S(x) corresponds to
a rectangle, then the adversary is constrained to perturbations that are
rectangles.
• Let ≡ be an equivalence relation on the set of labels L. Let C∗(x) be the
true label of x. Consider the invariant I as follows:
(x, x˜) ∈ I iff C∗(x) ≡ C∗(x˜).
In other words the adversary is constrained to stay in an equivalence class
of labels.
The first invariant partitions the input space of the classifier, but not nec-
essarily its output space. Two input samples might have the same label but
have different values of S. For example, two objects classified as the same class
might have different colors (if S is defined as the color of the object).
Another example of invariant generalizes robust features [43, 23]. Suppose
X = Rk+n, and the adversary is not allowed to change the first k dimensions
(i.e. these are robust features). In this case, we can define I ⊆ X × X as the
following relation:
{(x, x˜) | x↓k = x˜↓k},
where ↓k is the projection to the first k dimensions.
These features are robust to adversarial perturbations, and any function on
them is immune to adversarial perturbations as well, since S(A.x) = S(A.x˜).
There are different ways of extracting such robust features. A recently proposed
method utilize the very-slow process of adversarial training to reveal robust
features. This method, however, incurs a considerable accuracy cost for modest
perturbations [23]. For example, training with robust features that are extracted
from an adversarially trained model (with ‖δ‖2 ≤ 0.25) on CIFAR-10 yields a
natural accuracy of less than 85% compared to 95.3% on the original model.
Another venue of extracting these robust features is to view the classification
problem within the context of a larger system. Classifiers are typically deployed
in multi-modal or multi-sensor settings. Utilizing these extra modalities, which
the attacker cannot easily perturb, provides a venue for robust features. For
example, consider the road sign classification problem, where smart vehicles
have access to sensors such as LiDAR and localization. While features from
these sensors might not be strongly predictive of the correct label, they can
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assist in identifying the road sign. These features enable the extraction of high-
level semantics such as the speed limit or the shape of road sign. Using LiDAR
we can identify the shape of the road sign with very high accuracy. A circular
shape, for example, does not indicate the actual label but it narrows down the
classification task from 43 original labels to 23 labels.
3.2 Why do Invariants Help?
Intuitively, invariants help in limiting the attacker’s actions. A typical attacker
aims to minimize the size of the adversarial perturbation over the space of
adversarial examples, T . This space could refer to an ℓp-norm ball around an
input x in the case of digital attacks, or a set of general transformations (e.g.,
adding patches, rotations) in the case of physical attacks. We can pose the
attacker’s problem as:
min d(x, x˜)
s.t. (x, x˜) ∈ T , (3)
where d(., .) refers to the distance in some metric space. Enforcing an invariant
I on the attacker changes the second condition from (x, x˜) ∈ T to (x, x˜) ∈ T ∩I.
If T ∩ I ⊂ T , then:
min
(x,x˜)∈T ∩I
d(x, x˜) ≥ min
(x,x˜)∈T
d(x, x˜).
This observation indicates that limiting the attacker’s space of perturbations
through an invariant results in perturbations that are farther away from the
original input. Forcing the attacker to generate larger perturbations improves
the robustness of the model.
Recent results in literature have suggested that robustness and accuracy
cannot be simultaneously achieved [43]. Other results show that while robust
classifiers, with high natural accuracy, might exist, they are not computationally
feasible to learn [5, 1]. Next, we describe how invariants affect these results by
making robustness feasible from statistical and computational aspects.
3.2.1 Robustness and Accuracy no Longer at Odds
We consider the setting of Tsipras et al. [43, 23] of a binary classification task. In
this setting, robustness and accuracy are at odds [43]. Here, we show, over the
same setting, that imposing an invariant on the attacker improves the defender’s
accuracy-robustness trade-off.
They work in a binary classification setting and have d + 1 features. The
data distribution D is defined as follows: A sample (x, y) is generated as follows:
• First a label y is sampled uniformly from {−1,+1}.
• Feature x1 takes on value +y with probability p and −y with probability
1-p.
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• Features x2, · · · , xd+1 are sampled from the distribution N (ηy, 1)
N (µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. This
setting defines a binary classification task with two types of features: one robust
feature that predicts the correct label with a probability p and a set of features
that “moderately” predict the output label sampled from N (ηy, 1). A classifier
that averages the features x2, . . . , xd+1 has near perfect natural accuracy but
fails under an ℓ∞-bounded adversary that can perturb each feature by 2ηy.
Tsipras et al. formalize this observation by the following theorem (reproduced
from their recent paper [43] with a simple change of notation to avoid clash of
notation for δ):
Theorem 1. Any classifier that attains at least 1 − γ natural accuracy on D
has adversarial accuracy at most p1−pγ against an ℓ∞-bounded adversary with
‖δ‖∞ ≥ 2ηy.
Theorem 1 shows that, in this setting, a trade-off between robustness and
accuracy exists. For example, a classifier with natural accuracy of 99% has
an adversarial accuracy of 19% when p = 0.95. The robust feature provides a
baseline natural and adversarial accuracy equal to p. To improve the natural
accuracy beyond p, the classifier relies on the other features. An ℓ∞-bounded
adversary that can perturb each feature by 2ηy effectively flips the distribution
of x2, . . . , xd+1 from N (ηy, 1) to N (−ηy, 1). The result of a model trained
on the original distribution is unreliable under this flipped distribution, which
degrades the adversarial accuracy.
Imposing an invariant on the same ℓ∞-bounded adversary prevents it from
completely flipping the distributions of x2, . . . , xd+1 fromN (ηy, 1) toN (−ηy, 1).
The invariant restricts the attacker’s actions within the ℓ∞ ball; a more restric-
tive invariant improves the adversarial robustness. Consider an invariant where
the adversary is not allowed to perturb the first k features.
In such a case, one can construct a meta-feature x′1 defined as the sign of the
average of x2, . . . , xk+1 such that: x
′
1 = sign
(
1
k
∑k+1
i=2 xi
)
, where 1
k
∑k+1
i=2 xi ∼
N (ηy, 1
k
). The meta-feature predicts y = 1 when x′1 ≥ 0 and predicts y = −1
when x′1 < 0.
This meta-feature is predictive of y as follows: p′ = P (x′1 = y) =
1
2
P
(
N
(
ηy,
1
k
)
≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ y = 1
)
+
1
2
P
(
N
(
ηy,
1
k
)
< 0
∣∣∣∣ y = −1
)
= P
(
N
(
η,
1
k
)
≥ 0
)
= 1− Φ−1(−
√
kη).
(4)
Recall that Φ−1 is the inverse of the CDF for the normal distribution. If k is
large enough such that k ≥ 9/η2, then p′ > 0.99. Recall that as long as k < d,
this adversary is still the same ℓ∞-bounded adversary with which we started the
discussion. Then, x′1 is a robust feature that is highly predictive of the output.
This meta-feature was constructed via imposing a constraint on the adversary,
and is not similar to x1 which is provided as part of the problem setup.
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Figure 2: The improvement in adversarial accuracy as the invariant imposes a
tighter constraint in the setting of Tsipras et al. [43].
Given the result of theorem 1, the robustness-accuracy trade-off can re-
worded as: Any classifier that attains at least 1 − γ natural accuracy on D
has adversarial accuracy at most p
′
1−p′ γ against an ℓ∞-bounded adversary with
‖δ‖∞ ≥ 2ηy subject to the invariant that the first k elements of δ are zero. If
the value of k is large enough, the value of p′ can be much larger than that of
p so that both natural accuracy and adversarial accuracy can be close to 99%.
Fig. 2 shows the adversarial accuracy for a toy example with d = 200 and
for different values of η less than or equal to 1. For all the values of η, the
natural accuracy reaches nearly 100%. The value of k controls the invariant.
It is evident from the figure, that for small values of η, even when k is much
smaller than d, the adversarial accuracy exceeds 90%. The main takeaway is
that imposing an invariant even on a relatively small number of features can
improve the defender’s adversarial robustness.
3.2.2 Invariants Make Robustness Feasible
Researchers have started investigating the computational limitations of learning
robust classifiers. This line of investigation started with Bubeck et al. [5] and
continued with Degwekar and Vaikunthnathan [1]. We describe the construc-
tion of Degwekar and Vaikunthnathan [1] based on Pseudo-Random Functions
(PRFs). This construction shows a scenario where a robust classifier exists but
is hard to find in polynomial time.
Let Fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a PRF with a secret key k. PRFs are an
important building block in cryptography [25]. Let (Encode,Decode) be an
error-correcting code (ECC), where Encode encodes a message and Decode
decodes a message which can “correct” a certain number of errors. Recall that
there are excellent ECC in the literature. For example, the construction of
Guruswami and Indyk [18] can tolerate constant fraction (14 − ǫ) errors and still
enable correct decoding.
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Basic Construction Consider the following two distributions:
D0 = {0, Encode (x, Fk(x))}
D1 = {1, Encode (x, 1− Fk(x))},
where x is drawn uniformly from {0, 1}n, k is the secret key, and ‘,’ is a con-
catenation operator.
Note that there exists a perfect classifier because the first bit of the sample
indicates which distribution (D0 or D1) it belongs to. This classifier provides
perfect natural accuracy and is easy to learn. This “trick” was introduced by
Bubeck et al. [5].
There exists a robust classifier R: given an x˜ ∼ Db where b ∈ {0, 1} and key
k, R executes Decode(x˜) and obtains x, and checks the last bit to see whether
it is Fk(x) or 1 − Fk(x) (this can be done because R has the secret key k).
Due to the properties of the ECC, R can tolerate a constant fraction of the
errors. If the attacker flips the first bit of Db, a robust classifier is hard to learn.
Without knowing the key k, a robust classifier has to essentially predict the
output of Fk(x) from x only. Such a classifier cannot achieve better accuracy
than 12+negl(n) (where negl(n) is a negligible function of n). This result follows
from the fact that Fk(·) is a PRF (i.e. essentially a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary (PPTA) cannot distinguish between Fk(x) and a random bit) [1]. This
setting demonstrates a situation where a robust classifier exists but cannot be
found in polynomial time.
Next, we show an invariant which when imposed on the above-mentioned
scenario negates the hardness result. Let B = {0, 1}. Now suppose there is
an invariant I ⊆ Bn+2 × Bn+2 such that ((b, x, y), (b′, x′, y′)) ∈ I implies that
b = b′ or the attacker is not allowed to change the first bit. In this case, a
robust classifier exists because the classifier can just inspect the first bit and
correctly classify the sample. The classification accuracy stays at 100% because
the adversary cannot perturb the first bit, which indicates which distribution
the sample belongs to.
Extended Construction One can extend the above construction to allow
for higher robustness by considering the following two distributions.
D0 = {0, 0, 0, x0}, where x0 = Encode(x, Fk(x))
D1 = {1, 1, 1, x1}, where x1 = Encode(x, 1− Fk(x))
Where x is drawn uniformly from {0, 1}n and k is the secret key.
As with above, a perfect, and easy-to-find, classifier exists by inspecting at
the first bit of the sample. Similarly, there exists a robust classifier R by running
Decode over x˜ and then predicting the last bit. As with before, if the attacker
flips the first bit of Db, a robust classifier is hard to learn.
Now, suppose there is an invariant I ⊆ Bn+4 × Bn+4 such that:
((b1, b2, b3, x), (b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3, x˜)) ∈ I =⇒ (b1, b2, b3), (b′1, b′2, b′3) 0 < 2
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or the attacker is not allowed to flip more than one bit in the first three bits.
In this case, a robust classifier exists because the classifier can just look at the
majority of the three first bits and correctly classify the sample. The classifica-
tion accuracy stays at 100% because the adversary cannot change the majority
of the bits, which indicates which distribution the sample belongs to.
Both constructions above clearly show that invariants can have an effect
even on scenarios meant to create “computationally hard” cases.
4 Hierarchical Classification
Having established that invariants limit the attacker’s attack space and poten-
tially improve robustness, we look into how to leverage invariants in classifica-
tion. In this paper, we consider a specific type of invariant as defined in the
previous section. This invariant constrains the attacker to stay in an equivalence
class of labels, such that:
(x, x˜) ∈ I iff C∗(x) ≡ C∗(x˜).
These invariants represent the grouping of labels into more general and se-
mantically relevant attributes. Enforcing such an invariant means that each
input sample falls within an equivalence class of labels. The final prediction has
to be within the labels belonging to the equivalence class. An attacker cannot
change the classification of an input to a label outside the equivalence class in
which it falls.
It is natural to view these invariants as partitioning the classification prob-
lem into smaller pieces, which is the reason why we consider them in the first
place. Formally, we consider invariants that partition the set of labels L into
N subsets of labels Li (each representing an equivalence class of labels) such
that: Li
⋂
i6=j Lj = φ and
⋃
1≤i≤N Li = L. We treat the classification within
each subset of labels Li as a standalone classification problem.
We leverage these invariants to hierarchically classify input samples. Sequen-
tially applying the invariants narrows down the classification task into predicting
within smaller sets of labels. The outcome is a decision tree-like structure where
each invariant splits the label space further. At the leaves of the decision tree,
we design robust classifiers that predict within smaller label space. In summary,
we have two types of classifiers: intermediate and leaf. The intermediate classi-
fiers extract high-level features of the data that split the label space. The leaf
classifiers make the final classification decision within the reduced set of labels.
For example, a two-level hierarchical classification would have an intermedi-
ate classifier deciding in which equivalence class (Li) does the input sample fall.
Then, one of the N leaf classifiers decides the final prediction within the labels
in Li. Sec. 5 shows a real-world example of the hierarchical classification.
One can draw parallels between this approach and the simple Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) case. The intuition here is that on the original data, the
first couple of components would discriminate different classes and intra-class
variance would be left to the last components. In this approach, the intermediate
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Figure 3: High-level description of the hierarchical classifier. The thin arrows
highlight data flows while thick arrows indicate decision paths. The original set
of labels is {1, . . . ,m}. Each intermediate classifier splits the label set further.
Each leaf classifier predicts within a reduced set of labels. For example, the
left-most classifier assigns each label within {1, . . . , i} a probability value while
assigning the other labels {i+ 1, . . . ,m} a probability of 0.
classifiers extract features that model the inter-class variance and the leaf clas-
sifiers model the intra-class variance (discriminating labels in the reduced label
set). Another added benefit to this approach is explainability. As equivalence
classes are derived from physical world constraints, typically comprehensible to
humans, this approach provides some notion of explainability to the predictions,
akin to small decision trees [15].
4.1 Structure of Hierarchical Classifier
The hierarchical classifier is a mapping from Rk+n to Rm, where n is the di-
mension of the original input, k is the dimension of the additional features the
defender has access to, and m is the dimension of the original label set. Fig. 3
show the high-level structure of the hierarchical classifier, including the input
features, classifiers, and output vectors.
4.1.1 Intermediate Classifiers
We assume the defender has access to a set of robust features through adversarial
training or from other sensors. Depending on the classification problem, one
can define high-level attributes from these robust features. These attributes
partition the label space into equivalence classes; each value of an attribute is
associated with an equivalence class. The intermediate classifiers predict the
values of user-defined attributes.
Given a label set L, an intermediate classifier partitions this label set into N
classes, where N ≤ |L|. It maps an input from Rk (robust features) to a subset
of the labels. Each class might have a leaf classifier or another intermediate
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Figure 4: The robustness radius as function of the size of label sets in CIFAR-10,
using the randomized smoothing approach of Cohen et al. [11].
classifier; we do not assume the hierarchy to be balanced (Fig. 3). An interme-
diate classifier need not be a DNN. For example, the location of a vehicle can
be mapped to type of road is travelling. The type of road partitions the set of
speed limit road signs.
4.1.2 Leaf Classifiers
Within a set of labels L of size |L| ≤ m, narrowed down through a sequence of
intermediate classifiers, a leaf classifier makes the final classification output. A
leaf classifier is a mapping from Rk+n to R|L|. To train this classifier, only the
samples which have labels within L are needed. The overall inference is very
similar to the decision tree; each intermediate classifier chooses the next one to
be invoked till the inference reaches a leaf classifier. Only one leaf classifier is
invoked per input. The leaf classifier returns a probability distribution over L.
All other labels in L \ L are assigned a probability of 0.
The leaf classifiers can be made more robust through utilizing techniques
such as certified smoothing or adversarial training as indicated in Sec. 2. Below,
we show that reducing the number of labels improves the robustness of the leaf
classifiers relevant to the original classifier.
4.2 Robustness Analysis
The hierarchical classifier offers improved robustness at two levels. Forcing the
attacker into an equivalence class of labels limits its targeted attack capability;
an attacker cannot move the input outside its equivalence class. The leaf clas-
sifier, predicting within reduced label set, improves the robustness certificate –
making the classifier stable within a larger ball around the input. This property
limits the attacker’s attack capability within the same equivalence class.
We find that classification on the reduced label sets improves robustness
relative to the original classifier. Put differently, knowing that a certain input
x falls within an equivalence class, the robustness certificate of x is larger on
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the leaf classifier than it is on the original classifier. This robustness property
is subtle; it arises from the observation that reducing the labels increases the
distance between the decision boundaries. We show that this property holds for
any general classifier.
Let α : Rn → ∆(L), where ∆(L) is the set of all distributions over L. For
ease of notation, α(x)l (for l ∈ L) denotes the probability corresponding to l in
α(x). Fix c ∈ L and define Hc,α(x, L) (where L ⊆ L as follows):
α(x)c − max
l∈L ∧ l 6=c
α(x)l
It is easy to see that if L1 ⊆ L2, then Hc,α(x, L2) ≤ Hc,α(x, L1), or Hc,α is
anti-monotonic in the second parameter. Recall that Hc,α is similar to “hinge
loss”. If we instantiate α by the output of the softmax layer and use the ar-
gument of Hein and Andriushchenko for any classifier [20], we can immediately
see that robustness radius increases as the set of possible labels is decreased. A
similar argument can be used for the smoothing approaches [11, 27]. For exam-
ple, Fig. 4 shows the robustness radius for label subsets of different sizes from
CIFAR-10. The robustness radius is computed using the randomized smoothing
approach of Cohen et al. [11]. It is evident from the figure that as the subset
size decreases, the average robustness per sample increases.
4.3 Accuracy and Robustness Guarantees
The above analysis motivates the improvement in the trade-off between accuracy
and robustness of employing the hierarchical classification versus the original
classifier. In terms of accuracy, the error rate of the hierarchical classifier is a
function of the error at the intermediate classifiers and the leaf classifiers. Given
a leaf classifier F that predicts from labels L, the accuracy is:
|L|∑
i=1
P (C∗(x) = i).P (C(x) = i|C∗(x) = i).
The probability is taken over the samples x ∈ X ; empirically this probabil-
ity is computed over some test set within X . For simplicity, assume the data is
drawn uniformly from the labels, so that the accuracy is 1|L|
∑|L|
i=1 P (C(x) = i|C∗(x) = i).
In the hierarchical classification, the overall accuracy is the sum of the accu-
racy of each leaf classifier weighted by the accuracy of the intermediate classifier
correctly predicting the corresponding equivalence class.
When the intermediate classifiers predict the equivalence class very accu-
rately (we show such examples in the next section), the total accuracy of the
hierarchical classifier is lower-bounded by that of the base classifier. The lower
bound is because the base classifier might assign an input example a label outside
its correct equivalence class. When enforcing the correct equivalence class, the
leaf classifier might correct the prediction result. In the construction scenario
we show above, the leaf classifier will never misclassify the correctly classified
examples from the base classifier.
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The robustness guarantees of the original classifier depends on that of each
individual classifier (the intermediate and the leaves). Given a set of classifiers
composing the hierarchical classification, the attacker needs to attack only one
of them to change the classification output. Then, the robustness guarantee of
the hierarchical classifier is the minimum of the guarantees of the composing
classifiers (intermediate and leaf ones). z
To see why the robustness guarantee of the hierarchical classifier is the min-
imum of the guarantees of the composing classifiers, consider the simple case of
three classifiers: f1, f2, and f3 which form a larger classifier F . The hierarchy
is such that f1 is a binary classifier deciding between passing the input to f2
or f3, which are the leaf classifiers. A white-box adversary aims to attack the
larger classifier F as usual (where C(x) is the predicted label):
min‖δ‖p s.t. C(x+ δ) 6= C(x) (5)
Using the internal knowledge of the classifier, the adversary’s objective can
be restated as:
min‖δ‖p s.t.
f1(x+ δ) 6= f1(x))
or f1(x+ δ) = f1(x) ∧ f2(x+ δ) 6= C(x)
or f1(x+ δ) = f1(x) ∧ f3(x+ δ) 6= C(x).
(6)
Since only one of the constraints has to be satisfied, the problem can broken
down into smaller subproblems:
min‖δ‖p = min (‖δ1‖p, ‖δ2‖p, ‖δ3‖p) ,
where:
‖δ1‖p = min‖δ‖p s.t. f1(x+ δ) 6= f1(x))
‖δ2‖p = min‖δ‖p s.t. f1(x+ δ) = f1(x) ∧ f2(x + δ) 6= C(x)
‖δ3‖p = min‖δ‖p s.t. f1(x+ δ) = f1(x) ∧ f3(x+ δ) 6= C(x).
(7)
We can take the lower bound ‖δ2‖p and ‖δ3‖p by solving the less constrained
problem of:
‖δ2‖p ≥ ‖δ′2‖p = min‖δ‖p s.t. f2(x + δ) 6= C(x)
‖δ3‖p ≥ ‖δ′3‖p = min‖δ‖p s.t. f3(x+ δ) 6= C(x).
(8)
Finally, the lower bound of the needed perturbation to attack F is the min-
imum of the perturbations needed to attack each network individually. In par-
ticular, min‖δ‖p ≥ min (‖δ1‖p, ‖δ′2‖p, ‖δ′3‖p). If each network has a robust-
ness guarantee such that ‖δ1‖p ≥ R1, ‖δ′2‖p ≥ R2, and ‖δ′3‖p ≥ R3, then
min‖δ‖p ≥ min(R1, R2, R3). It is straightforward to generalize this example for
multiple and non-binary intermediate classifiers.
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5 Case Study: Road Sign Classification
We performed several experiments to answer a fundamental question: Does the
proposed hierarchical classification improve the robustness vs. accuracy trade-off
in real-world settings? Using a combination of the GTSRB [41] and KITTI [16]
datasets, we analyze this question in the context of road sign classification (e.g.
to be used by autonomous vehicles) aided by robust features (i.e. shapes) ex-
tracted from an auxiliary input source, i.e. LiDAR point clouds. While con-
ventional computer vision techniques can be used to extract the shape of an
object from raw pixel values, these are not fool-proof i.e. the inputs are easy
to perturb. Thus, we require an input that is hard to adversarially perturb in
the real-world. LiDAR point clouds satisfy this criteria, providing us robustness
for free. It is imperative to assure that the root is robust; errors at the root
cascade through the hierarchy. Additionally, the presence of LiDARs in most
autonomous vehicles further validates our choice.
Our experiments suggest that:
1. The hierarchical classification approach improves the robustness vs. ac-
curacy trade-off; for the same model architecture, while maintaining the
same accuracy (if not better in some cases), the proposed approach pro-
duces an average increase in robustness1 by > 60%.
2. Extending the hierarchy using multiple invariants further improves robust-
ness. In our case study, we combined shape and location constraints to
obtain an average increase of > 80% for speed limit signs (which can be
thought of as circular signs at a given geographic location).
We stress that this case study does not represent “the solution” to com-
pletely protect against adversarial attacks in the physical world. Instead, it
demonstrates that invariants significantly raise the bar for launching specific
type of adversarial attacks. It does so while improving robustness at no harm
to accuracy.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We use two datasets: the first is the German Traffic Sign Recognition Bench-
mark (GTSRB) [41] which contains 51,840 cropped images of German road signs
which belong to 43 classes; Fig. 5 shows these classes. The second is the KITTI
dataset which contains information over a five-day recording period from an
instrumented vehicle on the roads of Karlsruhe, Germany. The KITTI dataset
contains time-stamped location measurements, high-resolution images, and Li-
DAR scans. We post-processed this dataset to extract the cropped images of
the included road signs as well as the corresponding LiDAR depth maps. To
do so, we retrained a YOLOv3 object detector [35] to detect the German road
signs using the German Traffic Sign Detection Benchmark (GTSDB) dataset.
1Used interchangeably with the robustness certificate of Cohen et al. [11]
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Figure 5: The hierarchy over the road signs from the GTSRB dataset.
We obtained the bounding boxes of all the road signs, which we then used to
obtain 3138 cropped images, their corresponding LiDAR depth maps, and their
labels. We manually verified the validity of all these labels.
For all the results we describe, the experimental setup is as follows. The
hierarchical classifier, as presented in Fig. 5 comprises a single root classifier
which extracts shape from the LiDAR point cloud inputs. Based on the shape
(circular, triangular, octagonal, inverse triangular, or rectangular), one of five
different leaf classifiers is activated. Unless mentioned otherwise, the architec-
ture for all classifiers in the hierarchy is a standard ResNet-20 model [19]. The
leaf classifiers are trained using randomized smoothing [11], and the robustness
certificate can be calculated as in Eq. 1. Since the root classifier operates on
point cloud inputs, robustness is achieved at the root for free2. Adversarial
attacks in the status quo do not impact the root classifier, as they are primarily
targeted towards fooling classifiers that operate on pixel inputs. We discuss the
case of a stronger adversary later in this section.
5.2 Feature Extraction
Recall that the proposed hierarchical approach works by breaking down the
classification problem into different phases. An initial classification is made
to obtain the robust feature (i.e. shape in our case study); observe that this
classification partitions the (label) space of road signs; each partition comprises
of road signs belonging to a particular shape. Over these reduced label spaces,
a (per-shape) robust classifier is trained for the final road sign prediction.
How does one obtain the robust feature? In our case study, we use do-
main knowledge of the classification problem to extract the shape using auxiliary
inputs. To obtain shape predictions, we trained different classifiers (of varying
size, architecture, and complexity) for 200 epochs. The training set comprised
of 2538 point cloud inputs, and the test set comprised of 600 point cloud inputs.
2This is under the assumption that the point cloud inputs are robust, and hard to perturb.
We validate this empirically in Sec. 5.6
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From our experiments, we observed that the ResNet-20 architecture trained
for 200 epochs on point clouds achieves the best, near-perfect, test accuracy
(98.42%). This motivates our selection of the ResNet-20 architecture for the
leaf classifiers as well.
5.3 Improving the robustness vs. accuracy trade-off
We re-iterate that the robust feature, shape, partitions the label space; labels
belonging to a particular shape (e.g. all speed limit signs are circular) belong
to a particular equivalence class. Based on the signs in the GTSRB dataset, we
observe that the diamond, octagon, and inverse-triangle shapes have a single
road sign belonging to each of their equivalence classes. Thus, for these shapes,
we do not require a leaf classifier; classifying based on the robust feature is
sufficient3.
The baseline for our experiments is a smoothed classifier [11] trained to
predict all 43 labels, trained using images from the GTSRB dataset. For thor-
oughness, we trained this and the other leaf (circle, triangle) classifiers in our
experiment with the noise parameter σ set to different values i.e. σ = 0.25, 0.5, 1
(refer Equation 1).
5.3.1 Retraining vs. Renormalization
Intuitively, the root classifier places an input into its corresponding equivalence
class. Assuming the root is accurate, the leaf classifiers only operate on inputs
belonging to a specific equivalence class i.e. labels belonging to a particular
shape. Thus, for obtaining such a leaf classifier, one could (a) utilize the base-
line classifier trained on 43 labels, discard the probability estimates of the labels
not of interest (i.e. labels belonging to a different equivalence class), and renor-
malize the remaining probability estimates i.e. use renormalization approach,
or (b) retrain a leaf classifier from scratch based on the labels belonging to
that particular equivalence class (i.e. obtain 2 new leaf classifiers). Figure 6
highlights how both these approaches impact the robustness certificate. When
evaluated on over 1000 distinct inputs for each equivalence class, it is clear
that both these approaches increase the robustness certificate. While the renor-
malization approach can only increase the robustness certificate, the retraining
approach can potentially decrease the robustness certificate for some inputs.
Why? Recall that the value of the robustness certificate is directly propor-
tional to the margin Φ−1(pA)−Φ−1(pB), where Φ−1 is the inverse of standard
Gaussian CDF, pA is the lower bound of P (C(x+ ǫ) = C(x)) – the probability
of top label, and pB is the upper bound bound of maxc 6=C(x) P (C(x+ ǫ) = c) –
the probability of runner-up label, and ǫ is drawn from N (0, σ2).
In the renormalized leaf classifiers, all estimates are the same as the base-
line classifier. However, depending on how the label space is partitioned, the
3Consequently, their robustness certificate is ∞
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(a) (Retrained) Circles (b) (Retrained) Triangles
(c) (Renormalized) Circles (d) (Renormalized) Triangles
Figure 6: Percentage improvement of robustness certificate on leaf classifiers
using retraining and renormalization.
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runner-up might either be in the equivalence class under consideration, or in a
different equivalence class. In the former scenario, renormalizing the probabil-
ity estimates (corresponding to the equivalence class alone) will further widen
the margin, and increase the certificate4. In the latter scenario, the runner-up
estimate pB′ has to be less than or equal to pB. Consequently, the margin
Φ−1(pA) − Φ−1(pB′) ¿ Φ−1(pA) − Φ−1(pB). On renormalization, this margin
widens further.
In the retraining scenario, however, we do not have knowledge about the
ordering of the probability estimates in the retrained classifier in comparison to
the baseline classifier. It is possible that for a retrained classifier and for a given
input, while the correct class’ estimate remains pA, the runner-up’s estimate
pB′ can be greater, lesser, or equal to the original (baseline) estimate pB. Thus,
the new robustness certificate can either be lower, greater, or the same as the
baseline scenario. This problem is more fundamental; since robustness is a
local property relying on the local Lipschitz constant, and the structure of the
decision spaces - partial or incomplete knowledge of any of these can result in
spurious selection of the runner-up label.
5.3.2 Certified Accuracy
While both approaches described above can improve the robustness certificate,
this must not be at the expense of accuracy [43]. Thus, for a fixed set of in-
puts, we also measure the certified accuracy i.e. the accuracy of classification
while employing N(= 105) Monte Carlo trials (as described in Sec. 2.3). Ob-
serve in Table 1 that (a) the renormalized classifier has comparable accuracy
to the baseline classifier (by construction, since it utilizes the same weights)
and (b) the retrained classifiers have better certified accuracy than the renor-
malized classifiers. In summary, both approaches do not greatly impact the
accuracy compared to the baseline. Thus, we have empirically demonstrated
that employing invariants can boost robustness without sacrificing accuracy.
Type σ Circular
Signs
(%)
Triangular
Signs
(%)
Baseline & 0.25 82.59 76.78
Renormalized 0.5 65.63 65.63
1 43.80 43.80
0.25 88.60 82.89
Retrained 0.5 75.70 67.91
1 54.70 42.69
Table 1: The renormalized classifier has at least the same certified accuracy as
the baseline classifier. The retrained classifier performs better.
4From our experiments, we observed that the probability estimates of labels that do not
belong to the equivalence class are oftentimes zero. In such scenarios, renormalization of the
probability estimates that belong to the equivalence class does not widen the margin, but
keeps it the same as before. Consequently, the certificate also remains the same.
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Figure 7: The percentage improvement of the robustness certificate for
SpeedLimit signs utilizing a 2 layer hierarchical classifier. These results are
a significant improvement on those of Fig. 6
5.3.3 Adding More Invariants
Using location information, one is able to again partition the label space. For
example, a highway can not have stop signs, or an intersection will not have a
speed limit sign etc. To validate this hypothesis, we performed a small scale
proof-of-concept experiment to further constrain the space of labels that is ob-
tained by splitting on the shape feature (i.e. see if we can obtain a subset of
the set of, say, circular labels). Using the location information from the KITTI
dataset, and local map data from OpenStreetMap [10], for particular locations,
we can further constrain the space of circular road signs to just SpeedLimit
signs. From Fig. 7, we observe that increasing the number of robust features (to
2 - shape and location) increases the robustness certificate further. The ordering
of robust features in the hierarchy (e.g. shape followed by location vs. location
followed by shape) to obtain the best increase in robustness is an open question,
one which we wish to tackle in future work.
5.4 KITTI Dataset Analysis
We performed the same set of experiments described above on the KITTI
dataset, where we are able to analyze the hierarchy end-to-end. As before,
each input was placed into an equivalence class based on the prediction of the
near-perfect root classifier. We only report the results for the circular and tri-
angular leaf classifiers, tested with 176 and 972 inputs respectively5.
Consistent with our experiments on GTSRB, through renormalization, we
observe an average increase in the robustness certificate for inputs belonging to
both equivalence classes.
5The skew in inputs is due to lack of diversity in the examples obtained from the KITTI
dataset
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Label Type σ = 0.25 σ = 0.50 σ = 1
Circles 18.79% 19.07% 11.63%
Triangles 27.17% 1.90% 18.18%
Table 2: Improvement in robustness certificate for different equivalence classes
The certified accuracy improves in the hierarchical structure as well. To
understand how this is the case, we first compute the certified accuracy of the
baseline classifier. The results are summarized in Table 3. Unlike the earlier
results, we suspect that the certified accuracy for inputs belonging to the circle
equivalence class are high because of (a) imbalance in the training data used
for the baseline i.e. the classifier may have been overfit for inputs belonging to
these classes, or (b) small number of samples (only 176).
Label Type σ = 0.25 σ = 0.50 σ = 1
All 94.34% 89.55% 85.01%
Circles 96.09% 93.5% 94.13%
Triangles 85.71% 69.89% 37.79%
Table 3: Certified accuracy for different label types for the baseline classifier
Observe that the certified accuracy for the hierarchical classifiers (refer Ta-
ble 4) is comparable to that of the baseline scenario. We compute the accuracy
on the hierarchical classifier by passing the depth map through the root clas-
sifier, and then the corresponding image through the leaf classifier. The minor
variance is caused by the error associated with the Monte Carlo trials while
prediction at the leaf. Thus, the results obtained while analyzing the KITTI
dataset are consistent with those in Sec. 5.3.
Label Type σ = 0.25 σ = 0.50 σ = 1
Circles 95.16% 92.82% 93.49%
Triangles 83.19% 71.54% 42.90%
Table 4: Certified accuracy for different label types when the classifier is renor-
malized
5.5 Attacks on Point Clouds
Abundant prior work has demonstrated adversarial attacks on images; these
techniques naturally transfer over to attacking the leaf classifier. But do they
work on the root classifier? Based on our threat model defined in Sec. 2.2,
attacks on the root classifier need to be manifested in the real world. We would
like to stress that our threat model assumes a passive adversary, and this is
consistent with several other works in this space; active adversaries are beyond
the scope of this work. While the requirement for real-world realizability may
seem very strict, we shall see how relaxing the condition does not provide the
adversary much leverage.
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How does one attack the root classifier? In the real-world, for an object
under consideration, Kurarin et al. [26] generate an adversarial example in the
digital space. They then print the adversarial example, and place it over the
physical object. A similar approach is employed by Athalye et al. [3]. Following
this procedure, we generated adversarial examples on the point cloud inputs, and
verified if these perturbations are realizable in the physical world. To generate
adversarial perturbations, we used the algorithms proposed by Goodfellow et al.
[17] (denoted FGSM), Carlini and Wagner [9] (denoted CW), and Madry et al. [30]
(denoted PGD). For each attack, parameters were chosen such to minimize (a) the
l2-norm, and (b) the l∞-norm of the perturbation. Based on the perturbations
generated by these algorithms, we compute the depth modifications made by
these perturbations (RW δ)6, and record the fraction of points perturbed (n).
Analogous to pixels in images, points constitute the fundamental units of
a point cloud; while pixel-perturbations are required to be imperceptible, real-
world perturbations are required to be tolerable. For example, painting over
a road sign is an adversarial attack, but such an attack is not tolerable. An
analogous approach in the pixel space would be to mask the entire input im-
age with random pixels. While adversarial, the new image obtained is easily
distinguishable from the original image.
Recall that each point in the point cloud represents the depth of the object
from the LiDAR sensor; any perturbation in the point cloud represents a change
in depth of the portion of the physical object represented by that particular
point. Intuitively, one may think of this as malforming the object in a strategic
manner, or drilling holes through it etc. Thus, larger the perturbation, greater
the change in depth. Consequently, the perturbation is more profound/evident
in the physical space. From Table 5, it is clear that none of the adversarial
attacks in the status quo will result in physically realizable attacks which are
tolerable. One can intuitively visualize this by combining the values for RW
δ and the number of points modified; it is clear that some attacks require a
sizable portion of the road sign to be modified (as discussed above). Doing so
will render the road sign unrecognizable, and consequently unusable.
5.6 Physically Realizable Noise
One might argue that the above attacks are not designed to generate physically
realizable adversarial examples, and thus the numbers reported in Table 5 are an
exaggeration of the extent an adversary must go to. Instead, an adversary could
use an algorithm tailored for physical perturbations, such as the one proposed
by Ekyholt et al. [14]. To this end, we implemented their algorithm to obtain
physically realizable adversarial examples; we then printed the stickers generated
by their algorithm, stuck them on road signs, and gathered the corresponding
point cloud information using a real-time 3D Velodyne LiDAR Puck with 16
channels and a 100m range [44]. From Fig. 8a, it is evident that stickers on the
stop sign do not impact the depth point cloud in any capacity; though these
6Obtained from data sheet of our LiDAR [44].
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l2 l∞
n (%) RW δ (cm) n (%) RW δ (cm)
CW
Avg: 13.78 27.50 15.67 30.40
Max: 71.48 285.47 77.73 235.23
FGSM
Avg: 5.84 19.94 29.53 74.10
Max: 38.09 279.41 93.55 260.86
PGD
Avg: 5.95 23.83 24.47 58.08
Max: 40.82 230.00 91.02 260.86
Table 5: Average and maximum distances of δ value perturbations from l2 and
l∞ norm bounded attacks. Most of these perturbations would be far from imper-
ceivable from humans. We use the following abbreviations (1) n = percentage
of pixels perturbed, and (2) RW = real world
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 8: Adversarially generated stickers and markings cover the signs. Trans-
parent plastic and glass is attached to (a) and (b) but are not detected by
LiDAR. (b) and (c) have metallic shapes attached to the backs of the signs
which alter the shapes seen in the depth PCs (Top) but have lower intensity as
seen in the reflectivity PCs (Bottom).
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stickers may impact the leaf classifiers, the robust feature (i.e. shape) is still
easy to extract.
At a high level, the objective of the adversary is to generate an adversarial
example that alters the shape without modifying the depth of the point cloud
greatly (unlike Table 5). We implemented this strategy in three different ways:
(a) using transparent material stuck behind the sign (Figure 8a), (b) using a
combination of transparent and opaque objects stuck behind the sign (Fig. 8b),
and (c) using a larger opaque object stuck behind the sign (Figure 8c). We
make the following observations: (a) transparent objects do not impact the
depth and reflectivity point cloud7; the laser beam generated by the LiDAR
passes through these objects, and (b) while metallic objects impact the depth
point clouds, their presence can be detected using the reflectivity point cloud
(as evident by the blue regions around the stop sign in both Figures 8b and 8c).
While an adversary can circumvent these issues by using a metallic object
with the same reflectivity as the sign under consideration, such an approach
substantially increases the adversarial budget in comparison to the attacks in
the status quo. Additionally, such attacks are easily noticeable by a human-in-
the-loop. Thus, the hierarchical classification both improves the robustness vs.
accuracy trade-off, and increases the budget for an adversarial attack.
6 Related Work
Researchers have extensively studied the robustness of Machine Learning models
through exploring new attack strategies and various defense mechanisms. These
efforts are very well documented in literature [8]. In this section, we only discuss
work related to the different components of our classification pipeline.
Hierarchical Classification Recent research casts image classification as a
visual recognition task [48, 33, 40]. The common observation is that these
recognition tasks introduce a hierarchy; enforcing a hierarchical structure fur-
ther improves the accuracy. Similar to our approach, Yan et al. [48] propose
a HD-CNN that classifies input images into coarse categories which then pass
corresponding leaf classifiers for fine-grained labeling. They perform spectral
clustering on the confusion matrix of a baseline classifier to identify the clusters
of categories. This approach is optimized for natural accuracy and uses the im-
age data at all levels of hierarchy. In contrast, we employ robust features from
different modalities to construct more robust classifiers.
Srivastava et al. [40] show that leveraging the hierarchical structure can be
very useful when there is limited access to inputs belonging to certain classes.
They propose an iterative method which uses training data to optimize the
model parameters and validation data to select the best tree starting from an
initial pre-specified tree. This approach further motivates our tree-based hier-
7The amplitude of the pulsed laser from the LiDAR can be used to obtain the reflectivity
of the material it is reflecting off of.
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archy; in several settings, such as autonomous driving systems, a hierarchy is
readily available (as displayed by our experiments with shape and location).
Physically Realizable Attacks Extensive research is aimed at generating
digital adversarial examples, and defenses corresponding to ℓp- norm bounded
perturbations to the original inputs [17, 31, 26, 30]. However, these studies fail
to provide robustness guarantees for the attacks realizable in the physical world
due to a variety of factors including view-point shifts, camera noise, domain
adaptation, and other affine transformations.
The first results in this space were presented by Kurakin et al. [26]. The
authors generate adversarial examples for an image, print them, and verify if
the prints are adversarial or not. Sharif et al. developed a physical attack
approach [37, 38] on face recognition systems using a printed pair of eyeglasses.
Recent work with highway traffic signs demonstrates that both state-of-the-
art machine learning classifiers, as well as detectors, are susceptible to real-
world physical perturbations [13, 12]. Athalye et al. [3] provide an algorithm
to generate 3D adversarial examples (with small ℓp-norm), relying on various
transformations (for different points-of-view).
LiDAR Attacks Similar to our approach, Liu et al. [29] adapt the attacks and
defense schemes from the 2D regime to 3D point cloud inputs. They have shown
that even simpler defenses such as outlier removal, and removing salient points
are effective in safeguarding point clouds. This observation further motivates our
selection of point clouds as auxiliary inputs in the case study. However, Liu et
al. [29] do not physically realize the generated perturbations. Other approaches
consider active adversarial attacks against the LiDAR modalities [6], which can
be expensive to launch. In this paper, we focus on passive attacks (on sensors)
through object perturbations.
Xiang et al. [46] propose several algorithms to add adversarial perturbations
to point clouds through generating new points or perturbing existing points.
An attacker can generate an adversarial point cloud, but manifesting this point
cloud in the physical world is a different story. There are several constraints
need to be accounted for, such as the LiDAR’s vertical and horizontal resolution
and the scene’s 3D layout. . Still, an attacker would need to attack more than
one modality to cause a misclassification.
Robust Features Ilyas et al. [23] and Tsipras et al. [43] distinguish robust
features from non-robust features to explain the trade-off between adversarial
robustness and natural accuracy. While the authors show an improved trade-off
between standard accuracy and robust accuracy, it is achieved at the compu-
tational cost of generating a large, robust dataset through adversarial training
[23]. We circumvent this computational overhead by adopting invariants (and
consequently robust features) imposed by the constraints in the physical world.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss how robust features realized through invariants (ob-
tained through domain knowledge, or provided by real world constraints), when
imposed on a classification task can be leveraged to improve adversarial ro-
bustness without impacting accuracy. Better still, this is achieved at minimal
computational overhead. Through a new hierarchical classification approach, we
validate our proposal on a real-world classification task - road sign classification
- using two datasets (GTSRB and KITTI). We also show how some invariants
can be used to safeguard the aforementioned classification task from physically
realizable adversarial examples. Through the course of our work, we identified
key themes that we hope to focus in future research: (a) Do robust features
always exist?, and (b) Can these features be extracted efficiently?
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